RECENT CASES
ACCORD AND

SATISFACTION--OFFER

OF PART IN SETrLEMENT-EFFEC

OF

ACCrPTANcE-The defendant, plaintiff's agent, sent to plaintiff a statement of
account, stating that a check was enclosed in settlement of that account. After
a bona fide dispute as to the amount due, and with knowledge that defendant
claimed the amount of the check to be the true amount due, plaintiff cashed the
check and sued for a balance claimed. The defendant claimed an accord and
satisfaction. Held: Judgment for defendant. -Egan v. Crowther, District Court
of Appeals of California, August 5, 1925.
Vhere a claim is unliquidated, or in dispute, payment and acceptance, in
satisfaction, of a sum less than that claimed, operates as an accord and satisfaction. Nassoiy v. Tomlinso,, 148 N. Y. 326, 42 N. E. 715 (1896); Hull v.
Johnson, 22 R. I. 66, 46 Ad. x82 (igoo). To achieve this result, the money
must be offered in full satisfaction of the demand, and the accompanying acts
and declarations must be such that the creditor must understand that he is to
accept the money in full satisfaction only. Steidtmann t. Joseph Lay Co., 234
II. 84, 84 N. E. 640 (iqo8) ; Rose v. American Paper Co., 83 N. J. L 707, 8S
At. 354 (1912) ; Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231, 33 N. E. io34 (1893). If this
has been done, there is a good accord and satisfaction, even though the creditor
immediately notifies the debtor that the check is accepted only in part payment
and demands the balance. Barham v. Bank of Delight, 94 Ark. z58, z26 S. W.
394 (910). Where a dispute has arisen and a check is sent "in full"; McKenty
,. Oceanus Mfg. Co., 123 N. Y. Supp. 983 (1910) ; Connecticut River Lumber
Co. v. Brown, 68 Vt. 239, 35 At. 56 (1895) ; or "to balance account"; Lafrents
& Karstens Co. v. Catanagh, x66 Ill. App. 3o6 (19t) ; Aydlett v. Brown, 153
N. C. 334, 69 S. E. 243 (19io) ; it is held a good accord and satisfaction.
In the instant case, the fact that the. dispute did not arise until after the
check was sent was considered immaterial, as the plaintiff cashed it knowing
that the defendant had offered it in full satisfaction. Two New York cases
seem to require the controversy to have arisen first, and the check to have been
sent expressly to settle the controversy. Eames Vacuum Brake Co. v. Prosser,
157 N. Y. 289, 51 N. E. 986-(1898) ; Laroe v. Sugar Loaf Dairy Co., I8o N.
Y. 367, 73 N. E. 61 (Ipo5). It is believed, however, that these cases are distinguishable on their facts, and that the instant case is in accord with the generally accepted view, as shown in Nassoiy z% Tomlinson, supra.

BANxiupTcy-LIABIUTY

TO

INVOLUNTARY

PROCMEDINGS--STATt'S

OF CO-

OPMATIVE MARKETING AsSoCATIoN-The defendant association was incorporated under an Indiana statute proliding for the incorpation'of non-profit, cooperative associations, and was engaged in co-operative marketing of dairy
products. This was a petition for involuntary bankruptcy, the answer to which

denied that the defendant association was subject to the provisions of the bankruptcy laws of the United States. Held: Petition dismissed. In rt Dairy Afarkeh'ng Association of Ft. Wayne, Inc., United States District Court of Indiana,
November 14, 1925
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Held:
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howNational Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 85, 69 S. W. 759 (19o2). There are,
Union
Western
In
allowed.
been
has
recovery
where
circumstances
special
ever,
to pay
Tel. Co. v. Wells, 5o Fla. 474, 39 So. 838 (xgo5), the defendant refused
that
over money to plaintiff in accordance with the contract, its agent knowing
hours
twenty-four
for
traveling
plaintiff
the
in
failure to pay would result
on the
without funds. It was held that damages for mental suffering attendant
recovered.
be
could
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which
physical discomfort
that.
The grounds of the present decision are that the defendant bank knew
to
refusal
the
that
expenses;
vacation
for
credit
his
use
to
intended
the plaintiff
that
and
community;
strange
a
in
honor the checks left him without funds
humiliation and mental suffering were therefore the natural and probable consequence of defendant's wilful act.
This case thus goes even farther than Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wells,
supra, for here there is no physical injury--an element of damage which sounds
may
more in tort than in contract. It has been held that substantial damages
pecuniary
no
though
check
a
honor
to
bank
a
of
failure
the
be recovered for
i8At.
loss be shown. Pattersonv. Marine National Bank, 130 Pa. 419 (889),
from
resulting
reputation
business
to
damage
that
held
been
also
632. It has
such dishonor will be compensated. Spearing v. Whitney-Central National
Bank, 129 La. 6o7, s6 So. 548 (x9ii). But in no other case has mental suffering been allowed as an element of such compensation, and on its facts the instant case is contra to both the Kentucky and the Iowa cases cited above. In
thus extending the basis of recovery, it is submitted, the court goes far toward
allowing as an element of damage a condition hitherto regarded as too remote
to be compensated.
CAmuRias-DuTv To TaasPAssERs o0z TtAix-LIAMIuTY THaoUcH Na=GE-cE-Due to the failure of the defendant's engineer to observe a signal, the
train which he was handling collided with one on which the plaintiff's deceased
was a trespasser. Held: Recovery allowed. Bremer v. Lake Erie & IW.R. R.,
148 N. E. 86z (Ill., 1925).
It is a well-accepted principle that a trespasser on the carrier's cars or
premises is entitled to no protection from the carrier, except against wanton or
willful injury to him, or in other words, that the carrier exercise ordinary care
to avoid injuring him after discovering his presence. Biournquist v. R. R., 185
Mass. 130, 7o N. E. 53 (194); Van Ostrand v. R. R., 112 App. Div. 783, 99
N. Y. Supp. 548 (i9o6); Schifalacqua v.R. R., 249 Pa. 6o2, 95 Ad. 26o (i9'5).
See ioC. J. 876.
The trespasser in the instant case was neither known nor expected to be
on the train. Faced with a line of its own cases holding that knowledge of the
trespasser's presence is necessary, the court draws a distinction between trespassers on tracks and similar property and trespassers on trains, and holds that
the cases of the former class do not apply to the latter situation. It disposes
of the second objection by simply disregarding it. It does so by a mere restatement of the duty which a carrier owes to expected trespassers.
After speaking of the presumption of willfulness and constructive willfulness, it states that "the observance of duty (to notice signals) was essential to
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the safety of the trains and all persons and property on them." Liability is thus
ordinary care
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OF
CRIMINAL LAw-CoNFESSiONS TO ONE IN AUTHORITY-BURDEN

PROOF

of owning and opTO Snow VOLUNTARY NATuRE-The defendant was accused

in evidence
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been
had
it
that
proof
without
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he had
The accused denied the confession and said, without contradiction, that
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court
been beaten by his jailor for refusing to make such a statement. The
Held:
admitted the confession, and the defendant was convicted and appealed.
z925).
New trial granted. State t,.Zaccario, 129 S. E. 763 (V. Va-,
A confession made to one in authority is inadmissible unless made volunfalls the
tarily but there is a conflict of authority as to the party upon whom
that
believes
Wignore
Professor
voluntary.
burden of proving the confession
unless
the more practical rule would be to receive confessions without question,
(2d
they are shown to have been improperly induced. 2 WIGmoRE, EvIDEN.CE,
this
ed., 1923) 215. See 16 C. J. 733, n. 94, for a list of jurisdictions accepting
hold
rule. The majority of jurisdictions, including the Federal courts, however,
made withthat the prosecution in offering a confession must show that it w.as
Utah,
v,.
out compulsion, at least from the person to whom it was made. Hopi
11O U. S.'574 (1884); State z, Thoa., 250 Mo. 189, 157 S. W. 330 (913);
Thompson's Case, 20 Gratt. 724 (Va., 1870).
priIn Pennsylvania, the question of the admissibility of a confession is
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party has the burden of the proof does not seem to have arisen.
Wigmore, in Confessions, A Brief History and a Criticism, 33
the
Am. L REv. 376 (1899), gives the historical reasons for the strictness of
with
limitations on the admissibility of confessions, and states his belief that
should disthe disappearance of the reasons for the limitations the limitations
good
appear also. The West Virginia court in the present case feels that
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Professor Wigmore's statement, that the accused should have the burden
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whether
best
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he
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reasonable, still the person who obtains the confession is in just as good a posithe
tion as the accused to know whether it has been offered. Moreover, since
those
statements of officers of the law are apt to carry greater weight than
of the accused, it is only just to place upon the former the duty of establishing the case.
OF
HOMESTEAD LAw-NATvaE OF VETERA.'S RIGHT-INrERrRETATION
c.
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4602, further
through their guardian, should be entitled to exercise his right to enter the
until
additional eighty acres, should he have failed to do so. No entry was made
then
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The
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of
all
were
children
the
and
after the widow was dead
made a joint assignment to the plaintiff, who finally made the entry. Held:
The assignment operated to convey the right to enter the eighty acres. Anderson 2%'.Clune, 46 Sup. Ct. 69 (1925).
The rule obtaining in the past was contrary to the instant decision. The
Secretary of the Interior had decided that this right lapsed if not exerct;ed'or
assigned by the soldier, his widow, or his orphan children before their majority.
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46 L. D. 32 (1917). Both federal and state courts, however, had held before
this that the right to enter the additional acreage was- a propeity right and
could be assigned before entry was made upon the land. Webster v. Luther,
163 U. S. 331 (896) ; Mullen v. Wine, 26 Fed. 266 (C. C., z886) ; Barnes v.
Poirier,64 Fed. 14 (C. C. A., 78g4); Montgomery v. Pacific Coast Land Bureau, 94 Cal. 284, 29 Pac. 64o (1892) ; Webster r. Luther, 5o Minn. 77, 52 N. W.
271 (x892) ; Knight v. Leary, 54 Wis. 459, 1i N. W. 6oo (1882). The principal case merely takes the next logical step in holding that this right may be
inherited-that it passes as other personal property, to the personal estate of
the soldier immediately upon his death, subject only to the exercise of the
rights given to the widow and the minor orphan children. Thus, of course,
an assignment by the children after they had come of age would convey the
soldier's right of entry.
Although this is a liberal interpretation, it is consistent with the spirit
of the statute, and in line with the policy of favoring veterans and their families.
INcOME TAx-IzsuANcE-WHAT RaEsRvE FUNDS AR DEnucrmxz-RzsEmv-In pursuance of the requirements of the Superintendent of Insurance of
New York, the plaintiff insurance company made a net addition to its reserve
funds to cover accrued but unsettled loss claims. The revenue-collector refused to deduct such fund from the gross income of the company in order to
determine the net sum subject to taxation. Held: The permitted deductions
specified by Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, § 12, do not necessarily include everything which may be denominated reserve fund by state statute or officers. The
reserve fund of the act does not include money held by a fire and marine insurance company to cover accrued but unsettled claims for losses. United
States v. Boston Ins. Co., 46 Sup. Ct. 97 (1925).
The Court states, as a reason for its holding, that the Act of Congress
deals with reserves, not particularly in their bearing upon the solvency of the
company, as the state statutes do, but only as they aid in determining what part
of the gross income ought to be treated as net income for purposes of taxation.
The court expressly adheres to and affirms the doctrine laid down in McCoach
V. Ins. Co., 244.U. S. 585 (1917). Maryland Casualty Co. V. U. S., 251 U. S.
342 (19zo), holds, contrary to the principal case, that a finding, that the Insurance Department of Pennsylvania, pursuant to statute, has at all time required the insurance company to keep on hand, as a condition of doing business in tnat state, assets (as reserves) sufficient to cover outstanding losses,
justifies the deduction of this reserve as one required by law to be maintained.
But, in commenting on that case, the court in the instant case says that the
findings supply no adequate ground for a holding contrary to the general doctrine theretofore approved in MeCoach t,. Ins. Co., supra.
It would seem that the decision in the principal case is the correct one.
The force of an express provision of a revenue law should not be controlled
or abridged by consideration of the provision of a state statute, for if the differing rules of taxation among the states were to be followed the federal statute would not work uniformly throughout the domain in which it is to operate.
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Roston R. Co. v. U. S., 265 Fed. 578 (C. C. A., 192). Furthermore, there is a
specific provision in the Act of i916, supra, for deducting all losses actually sustained within the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise. This is
another indication that losses in immediate contemplation, but not as yet actually
sustained, were not inended to be treated as part of the reserve funds.
INSOLVENCY-AsSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CanrroXS-VLn'rrY OF STIPULATION FOR RE.LAs-E-The officers of a corporation became personally liable

for the debts thereof through failure to comply with certain statutes. In a suit
by the creditors to enforce this liability, the defendants plead an agreement by
the creditors to release them from all liability in consideration of an assignment
of all the corporate property for their benefit. Held: Such an assignment is
void. Simmons HardwareCo. v. Rhodes, 7 Fed. (2d) 352 (C. C. A., 1925).
It is very generally held that an assignment by a debtor of part of his
property for the benefit of creditors, with a stipulation for his release from
further liability is fraudulent and void. Cases cited in 5 C. J. 1107; 14 COL. L.
Rzv. 528 (1914). But as to the validity of an assignment by a debtor of all
his property for the benefit of his creditors, with a similar stipulation, there is a
decided conflict of opinion. In England, such a provision in an assignment for
the release of the debtor has been upheld even against a claim of the Crown.
King v. Watson, 3 Exch. 6 (1817) ; Janes v. Whifebread, 20 L 3. C. P. (N.
S.) 217 (185) ; 2 KENT, Comm. 693 (1851).
In the United States, however, the weight of authority has, within recent
years, unquestionably inclined toward holding such assignments invalid. Seale
v. Vaiden, io Fed. 831 (D. C., i881) ; Nelson v. Harper,122 Ark. 39, 182 S. W.
Some of the reasons generally assigned for their invalidity are
519 (xgi6).
that they operate as a method of compelling the creditors to give up some of their
rights; May v. Walker, 35 Minn. 194,28 N. W. 252 (1886) ; see Halsey v. Whitney, Fed. Cas. No. 5964 (1825) ; that the debtor is driving a bargain for his own
benefit since he is absolutely discharged from his debts; Hubbard v. McNaughton, 43 Mich. 22o, 5 N. W. 293 (i88o); Grover v. Wakeman, ti Wend. 187
(N. Y., 1833) ; that such an assignment will, in effect, result in a discharge of
the debtor from his liabilities on better terms than insolvent laws permit to
debtors applying for this benefit; Sperry v. Gallaher, -7 Iowa 107, 41 N. W.
586 (x88g) ; Henderson v. Bliss, 8 Ind. ioo (1856); that it is contrary to the
doctrine that payment of part of a debt, in the absence of any dispate as to
the amount due, is no consideration for the release of the whole. Henderson
v. Bliss, supra.
Courts upholding such assignments have done so on the ground that since
a debtor has a right to prefer certain creditors, he may prefer those who shall
give him a release. Joel Bailey Datis Co. v. Augustus, ios Va. 843, $4 S. E.
985 (i9o6) ; McMillan v. Holley, 145 Wis. 6x7, 13o N. V. 455 (1911). Chief
Justice Marshall and Judge Story, both with a great deal of reluctance, upheld
these assignments on the ground of stare decisis. Brashearv. West, 7 Pet. 615
(U. S., 1833) ; Halsey v. Whitney, supra. In other jurisdictions, such releases
are authorized or required by statute. Kellog v. Cayce, 84 Tex. 213, 19 S. W.
388 (1892); McCord-Brady Co. v. Mills, 8 Wyo. 258, 6 Pac. 1oo3 (i8g).
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Pennsylvania long uph,.d such assignments with stipulations for releases.
Brashear v. ;'est, s-upra; Sheephanks v. Cohen, 14 S. & M 35. (Pa2 1825);
Mechanics Bank v.Gorman, 8 W. & S. 3o4 (Pa., 1844). But they have since
been made void by statute. Act of :849, P. L. 412, § 4, Pa. St. 192o, § 12072.
The decision in the instant case is not only in accoid with the weight of
authority and, it is submitted, the better view, but is also eminently just, since
there was an attempt there to make this assignment in order to avoid a liability
imposed by statute.
FOR WRrriNG OF
1xsrcA.E OF AUTOMOBILES-RE17CATION OF LICENSE
Caro1ou2cIs OUTSIDE STATE-The Palmetto Fire Insurance Company, a South

lina Corporauon, by contract with the Chrysler Sales Corporation, insured all
Chrysler cars against fire and theft The contract of insurance was made "to
Woom it may concern" and was aelivered to the Chrysler Company in Detroit.
A certificate of insurance is sent to the retail purchaser when he has bought the
car. The insurance Company was licensed to carry on insurance business in
Ohio and New York. In each of these states, the Insurance Commissioner
moved to revoke its license, and the company filed a bill to enjoin him from so
doing. Held: (in Ohio) Injunction denied; revocation permitted. Palmetto
Insurance Co. v. Corn, United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio, Eastern Division, November 13, ,925; (in New York) injunction
granted; revocation prevented. Palmetto insurance Co. v. Beha, United States
District Coit for the Southern District of New York, November 10, i925.
A State has the power to regulate insurance companies. Nat. Uxioa F. I.
Co. v. Wanberg, 233 U. S.389 (1913) ; People v. Formosa, 131 N. Y. 478, 30
N. E. 492 (1892) ; Commonwealth v. U'rooman, 164 Pa. 3o6, 3o At. 217 (1894).
It may require a foreign corporation to take out a license or certificate, and
may impose upon the license such terms or conditions as it may wish, provided
the terms are not unconstitutional. New York L. L Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S.
389 (igoo); Commonwealth v. Maryland Fidelity Co., 244 Pa. 67 at P. 71,
go AtL 437 at p. 439 (1914); Pa. Act of 1921, P. L. 682, Art. III § 301, Pa,
St Supp. x924 § x249ob-3oi. The license, if granted, may be revoked by the
Insurance Commissioner who granted it, but his act may not be arbitrary,
Peo::le v. Insurance Commissioner. 25 Mich. 321 (1872); State v. Harty, 276
S. N. 835 (xgiS); Pa. Act of 1921, P. L. 789, Art. V § 5o!,
Mc '- 2,38
-.
924 § x2490a-sox. Violations of the laws of the State or of
4upp.
Pa. St.
the conditions attached to the license constitute valid reasons for revocation.
The question in these cases was whether the act of the Commissioner was arbitrary.
The Ohio General Code (i91o) § 5438 provides that nc, insurance company may write policies on property in that State, unless they are countersigned by an authorized Ohio agent, so that the State may tax them. The
writing of this insurance in Michigan on automobiles which would eventually
become property in Ohio, was a violation of this law and the revocation was
proper. In New York, there was no such statute and, since the business was
a lawful one, the mere loss of revenue to the State was no reason for revocation. The act of the Commissioner was held arbitrary and was enjoinedL.
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The Ohio statute referred to all insurance companies. The Pa. Act of
igx, P. L 682, Art. V § 5oi, Pa. St. Supp. 1924 § i249ob-Sox is almost identical with the Ohio statute except that it applies to fire insurance companies only.
But since the insurance sold by this company is partly against fire, it would
come under this statute, and were this case to arise in Pennsylvania, it would
probably be decided in accord with the Ohio decision.
This novel insurance idea has occasioned considerable litigation. New developments will be discussed in the next issue.
SALEs-FuNGIBLE GOOns-PAssAGE OF Tin.E-A, having 618 quarters of
maize in defendant's warehouse, sold and gave a delivery order for 2oo quarters to W, who resold and gave a delivery order to the plaintiffs. A ordered
defendants to stop delivery and the plaintiffs bring this action for the goods
and for damages for non-delivery on the ground that there had been a sale to
them of the 2oo quarters. Held: Judgment for defendants. Laurie v. Dudin,

119251 2 K. B. 383.

The case of Whitehouse v. Frost, 12 East 614 (Eng., i8io) held upon similar facts that there was a sale. But the language of later cases disapproved
that decision, although not clearly overruling it, the later cases being distinguished either on the ground that something remained to be done to the goods
by the seller or on some other ground not always made clear in the cases.
Wallace t,. Breeds, 13 East 522 (Eng., 1811) ; Austin v. CraVen, 4 Taunt. 644
(Eng., 1812). But Whitehouse v. Frost, supra, has long been regarded as
having no weight in England and the instant case leaves no room for doubt
upon that question.
The trend of the American cases, beginning with the leading case of
Kimberly v. Patchin, ig N. Y. 330 (1859), has been to allow the passage of
title to a part of an undivided mass of fungible goods, where the intention of
the parties is that title to the portion sold shall pass, the vendee becoming tenant
in common of the whole mass with the vendor. Cushing z'. Breed, 96 Mass.
376 (1867); Westinghouse Co. v. Harris, 237 Pa. 2o3, 85 At]. 78 (1912);
Geoghegan v. Arbuckle, 139 Va. 92, 123 S. E. 387 (1924). This view is codified in the Uniform Sales Act, § 6, and is not only a better interpretation of the
intent of the parties but also is better adapted to the convenience of trade than
is the English view.
EMENT To REPURcHAs E STocx-PAzr
written order, purchased stock of a corporation, through the defendant, its agent and managing officer, in reliance upon
the defendant's oral agreement to repurchase if plaintiff became dissatisfied.
The stock was paid for and delivered. Plaintiff became dissatisfied, but defendant refused to repurchase. Held: The agreement was part of the original contract and the payment for and delivery of the stock took it out of the Statute
of Frauds, Sales Act of 1915, P. L. 543, § 4, Pa. St. i92o, § 19652. Roberts v.
Cauffel, 6 Pa. D. & C. 706 (July, 1924).
The case was affirmed in 283 Pa. 64, 128 At. 67o (March, 1925), but 14
of the Sales Act was not considered, having been declared unconstitutional in
STATUTE OF FAs--ORAx. A
PERFORMANCE BY SALE-Plaintiff, by

RECENT CASES
Guppy v.Moltrup, 281 Pa. 343, 126 Ati. 766 (November, 19a4). By Act of
1925, P. L. 310, § 4 of the Sales Act was amended so as to safisfy the constitutional objection. Thus the decision of the present case becomes of practical
interest.
The weight of authority favors the enforcement of such oral agreements,
but the cases advance two distinct theories. In one line of decisions, where the
vendor is owner of the stock, it is held that the oral agreement is part of the
original contract, but payment for and delivery of the stock takes the contract
out of the Statute of Frauds. Kuntzmann v. Petteys, 74 Colo. 342, 221 Pac.
888 (i93) ; Armstrong v'. Orler. 220 Mass. 112, xo7 N. E. 392 (i91); Johnson v. Trask, 116 N. Y. 136, 22 N. E. 377 (1889).
Another line of decisions, wherein the defendant acted only as agent, but
was an officer in the corporation whose stock he sold, adopts the theory that
the oral agreement to repurchase is in the nature of a contract of indemnity,
and as such is not embraced in the Statute of Frauds. Schoeffer v.Streider
236, z29 N.
203 Mass. 467, 89 N. E. 618 (igog) ; Trenholm v.Kloepper, 88 Neb.
W. 436 (191!); Lingelbach v. Lukenbach, x68 Wis. 481, 17o N. W. 711 (1919).
Since the facts of the present case fall within the second group of cases,
it would seem that the theory adopted is opposed to that followed in the majority of decisions on similar facts.
TRUSTS-RuLE AGAINST

PERPETUITIES-MAINTENANCE

OF' MEMORIALS-

The testator bequeathed iioooo to trustees of a Masonic temple erected by him
as a memorial to his son, the income to be used for "the maintenance and upkeep of the said Masonic temple--and the balance (if any) to be applied" to
Masonic charities. Held: Entire gift void. In re Porter, [1925] I Ch. 746.
The trustees argued that, the temple being a memorial, the principle of
the "tomb" cases applied by which the first part of the gift failing as a perpetuity, the whole gift should go to the charities. The court said a memorial
is not a tomb, and refusing to extend the doctrine, avoided the whole bequest.
An American case with similar facts, involving a Masonic bequest, is in
accord. Mason v.Perry, 22 R. I. 475, 48 Atl. 671 (zgox).
Some American cases have held that the Masons are a charitable institution;
Savannah v. Solomon's Lodge, 53 Ga. 93 (1874) ; Indianapolisv.Grand Lodge,
v.
25 Ind. si8 (z865) ; but the weight of authority is the other way. Bangor
Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 428 (1882); Mason v.Perry, supra.
The rule against perpetuities can be avoided, and a bequest such as the
above enforced, by a bequest to a charity on condition that the building be maintained, with a gift over to another charity in case of default. In re Tyler,
[i8gi] L. L 3 Ch. 252.
In the principal case it might have been argued that a memorial is a
charity, and that therefore the entire gift was valid. Smith's Estate, Walker's
Appeal, 18x Pa. 109, 37 Ad. 114 (1897), where the court said: "The memorial
monument is for the beautifying and adornment of the city, and for these reasons alone the gift would be upheld as charitable."
The case is interesting because of the refusal to extend the "tomb" cases
doctrine, mid also because no argument was based on the memorial character
of the temple making it a charitable use.

